WORKING PAPERS
- Pulling the Trigger: Party Responsibility in Coalition Termination (Dissertation)
In this paper, I extend the research on government termination by looking at the role of cabinet parties. In particular, I identify the types of parties that are more likely to prematurely leave a government, and thus lead to its termination, as well as explore potential mechanisms for this phenomenon. I investigate whether parties depart government based on ideological, electoral, and office incentives. The significance of these incentives is examined empirically using a dataset containing all governments in 18 European countries in the post-war period. The dataset also introduces a new classification of the different types of terminations, as well as identifies the parties that contributed to them. On the one hand, the results reveal that ideological conflict within the cabinet and electoral competition from the opposition are significant predictors of departure. On the other hand, there is no support for the expectation that parties engage in opportunistic behavior by leaving coalitions in order to pursue better outcomes. The results suggest that party-level analysis is an important tool in understanding coalition politics, and can help revisit some assumptions about both the formation and the termination process.
- Judging a Book by Its Cover: An ALL CAPS Approach to Fake News
Fun side project, where I explore how well can we predict the veracity of a news article, based on the use of words in all capital letters in the title..
WORK IN PROGRESS
- What Proportionality? (with Tasos Kalandrakis)
- This Gun's for Hire: Term Limits and the Case for Revolving Door Laws
